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HARRY LEROY JONES*

The Spurious Judgment Day Rule for
Converting Foreign Currency into Dollars
When Suit is Brought Upon an Obligation
Governed by Foreign Law: Deutsche Bank
filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey revisited.t
International transactions have become big business. Their inclusion in bar-association programs, work shops, seminars, practicing-law
institutes and law-school curriculums attest their growing volume and
importance. And many international transactions involve obligations
governed by foreign law and payable in foreign currency.
Let us suppose that a client asks your advice on a common type of
problem: He entered into a contract in Ruritania last year to deliver
steel to a construction company for 1,000,000 units of Ruritanian
currency. Due to cancellation of their building contracts, the construction company refused to accept delivery. Ruritanian economy is
worsening, and the value of its currency is falling. The construction
company is doing business in the United States. What are your client's
chances of recouping his loss by filing suit for breach of contract in an
American court?
You examine Beale on Conflict of Laws,1 Williston on Contracts, 2
the Restatement of Conflict of Laws 3 and Part 1 of the Proposed
Official Draft of Restatement, Second.4 All these state that the
foreign-currency measure of an obligation governed b' foreign law,
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t This article is an expansion of an opinion by the author as Chief Hearing Examiner in
Reissner v. Schering-Kahlbaum. Debt Claim 3410, Docket 55 D6 on August 24, 1956. The
claim eventually reached the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit as Rogers v. Reissner, 276 F.2f 506 (1960).
1 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 1341 (1935).
2 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, Sec 1410A, 3930 (1937).
3 Section 424, (1934).
4 Section 144, (1967).
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sued upon in the United States, will be converted into dollars as of the
date of the judgment, and all authorities rely on the decision of the
Supreme Court in Deutsche Bank filiale Niirnberg v. Humphrey, 272
U.S. 517 (1926).
Looking in Shepard, you find that Deutsche Bank has been
followed for its supposed "judgment-day" rule, or cited, in more than
30 United States Court of Appeals cases. Treatises' on money and
foreign exchange, and several law review articles, 6 cite Deutsche Bank
as establishing the judgment-day rule.
So you read Deutsche Bank and are surprised to find that the
majority opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes says nothing at all about
judgment day. He speaks only of the date of filing suit. The minority
opinion by Mr. Justice Sutherland argues against the day of judgment
and favors the day of the breach of contract as fixing the right of the
parties to payment in dollars.
Now how shall you advise your client?
At the time of the breach of the contract in Ruritania, a unit of
Ruritanian currency was worth almost one dollar. It is now worth
somewhat less, and by the time a judgment can be obtained three or
perhaps four years from now Ruritanian currency may be worthless.
If you are struck with the injustice to your client of the judgment
day rule and have a flair for hermeneutics, you may decide to subject
Deutsche Bank to the litmus of critical analysis. If you do, the
following is what you will find:
The Litigation in the Lower Courts
Charles Franklin Humphrey had a mark deposit in the Nurnberg
Branch of the Deutsche Bank in 1915. His demand for payment on
June 12, 1915, was refused. At that time, the mark had a value of
20.5691 cents. On April 6, 1917, when war was declared, the mark was
worth 181/2 cents. The bank closed out his account on June 30, 1917 by
payment to the German Treuhander. The American Alien Property
Custodian seized certain assets of the Deutsche Bank in this country.
On July 9, 1921, Humphrey filed a suit in the District Court for the
Northern District of California against the Alien Property Custodian
and the Treasurer of the United States under Section 9(a) of the
5 NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN LAW, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL, 367 (1942)
MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF MONEY, 315, (1953).
e.g., Evan, Rationale of Valuation of Foreign Money Obligations. 54 MICH. L. REV.
307 (1956); Fraenkel, Foreign Money in Domestic Courts, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 360 (1935);
Dach: Conversion of Foreign Money, 3 AM. J. COMP. L. 155,158 (1954).
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Trading with the Enemy Act. At this time, the mark was worth 1.3
cents. Humphrey asked payment of his deposit at 18Y2 cents per mark,
its value on April 6, 1917.
The Bank was made a party defendant, and carried the burden of
the defense. The Bank urged that the value of the mark on April 6,
1917, was immaterial and argued that its value on the date of a
judgment would control. The Custodian and Treasurer joined the Bank
in urging the date of judgment as controlling. (This date, obviously
would be very favorable to the financial interests of the defendants.)
The District Court held that Humphrey was entitled to recover the
amount of his deposit with the mark valorized as of the date of the
breach of the obligation, the date of the demand on the Bank, when the
mark was valued at 20.5691 cents. The Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. 7 F.2d 330 (1925). The Court relied heavily on Judge
Learned Hand's opinion in Guinness v. Miller, 291 F.769, which held
that where suit is brought under the Trading with the Enemy Act to
recover a debt on an account stated in Germany, the marks were to be
converted into dollars as of the date demand had been made and not as
of the date of the decree. Deutsche Bank petitioned for a writ of
certiorari, asking that the case be considered with two other cases then
pending before the court, involving the rate of exchange for converting
foreign currency obligations: Hicks, (who succeeded Miller) Custodian
v. Guinness, and Zimmerman v. Sutherland, Custodian. The Solicitor
General joined in the application.

The Case in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court decided Hicks v. Guinness on November 16,
1925. 269 U.S. 71. In an opinion for a unanimous court affirming, Mr.
Justice Holmes wrote that a foreign-currency debt due to an American
creditor, payable in the United States, vests as a claim for damages in
dollars as of the time of the breach of the obligation to pay, and that
the value of the foreign currency in terms of dollars is fixed at that
time. Justice Holmes' reasoning differed little from that of Judge
Learned Hand's in the district court.
The Solicitor General thereupon wrote a letter to counsel for
Deutsche Bank saying that he thought that the decision in the Guinness
case disposed of the Humphrey case, and that he intended to file a
motion with the Supreme Court to dismiss the certiorari as to the
officers of the United States. Counsel for the Bank, however, saw a
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distinction between the cases, and persuaded the Solicitor General not
to file his motion.
In its brief, the bank argued for the judgment-day rule, and
Humphrey, of course, argued for the breach-day rule which the District
Court and the Court of Appeals had approved. The Supreme Court was
presented with no third alternative.
The Court decided the case on November 23, 1926. Mr. Justice
Holmes wrote the opinion for a majority of five. The opinion reads in
part:
. The debt was a debt of German marks. The Courts below held that
it should be translated into dollars at the rate of exchange existing
when the demand was made. 7 Fed.(2d) 330. The value of the mark fell
after that date and a writ of certiorari was granted by this Court to
determine whether the time fixed for the translation into dollars was
correct. 269 U.S. 547.
In this case,unlike Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71, at the date of
the demand the German Bank owed no duty to the plaintiff under our
law. It was not subject to our jurisdiction and the only liability that it
incurred by its failure to pay was that which the German law might
impose. It had incurred no additional or other one since. A suit in this
country is based upon an obligation existing under the foreign law at
the time when the suit is brought, and the obligation is not enlarged by
the fact that the creditor happens to be able to catch his debtor here.
Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451. See Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Brown, 234 U.S. 542. We may assume that when the Bank failed to pay
on demand its liability was fixed at a certain number of marks both by
the terms of the contract and by the German law-but we also assume
that it was fixed in marks only, not at the extrinsic value that those
marks then had in commodities or in the currency of another country.
On the contrary, we repeat it was and continued to be a liability in
marks alone and was open to satisfaction by the payment of that
number of marks, at any time, with whatever interest might have
accrued, however much the mark might have fallen in value as
compared with other things. If the debt had been due here and the
value of dollars had dropped before suit was brought the plaintiff could
recover no more dollars on that account. A foreign debtor should be no
worse off.
There has been so little discussion of what we regard as the
principles that ought to govern this question that we refrain from citing
the many cases that have touched upon it and content ourselves with
stating what seems to us the proper rule. Here we are lending our
Courts to enforce an obligation (as we should put it, to pay damages),
arising from German law alone and ought to enforce no greater
obligation than exists by that law at the moment when the suit is
brought.
Decree reversed. (Emphasis supplied.)
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Mr. Justice Sutherland delivered the dissenting opinion, concurred
in by Justices McReynolds, Butler, and Sanford, reading in part:
... The majority opinion rests upon the distinction that the debt
upon which recovery here is sought was payable in Germany. The
distinction, I think, is fallacious, and proceeds from a very narrow view
of the principles applied in Hicks v. Guinness and Sutherland v. Mayer.
The view that the judgment date should govern puts undue
emphasis upon the character of the thing to be delivered and ignores
completely the all-important element of the time when the delivery
should have been made.
But in an action brought here to recover upon a failure to deliver
marks in Germany, the question of time becomes material; for here a
mark is not money, but a commodity; and, if plaintiff is to be
compensated in dollars for his loss, we must inquire, when did the loss
occur? Just as we must make that inquiry in order to fix in dollars the
value of wheat in a suit to recover for the nondelivery of that
commodity. To me it seems clear that, in the one case as in the other,
the basis of recovery must be the value in dollars of the thing lost at the
time of the loss.
To take the date of judgment for determining the value is to
adopt for the measurement of a loss a test resting upon the fluctuating
chances of a court calendar instead of upon an event already
fixed,-that is, to put aside certainty for uncertainty. The date of the
breach, whether of a contract to deliver goods or to pay money, marks
the essential event which gives rise to the cause of action and bears a
necessary relation to the wrong sought to be redressed: while the date
of the rendition of judgment bears no relation whatever to the wrong
complained of and has nothing to do with the cause of action. The
cases are not agreed; but an examination of them convinces me that the
conclusion I have indicated by the foregoing is supported by the great
weight of authority.
I think it is extremely desirable that the rule established should
be one capable of uniform application. To take the date of the
judgment is to establish a rule which does not meet this requirement.
The amount of the recovery will depend upon whether suit is promptly
brought or promptly prosecuted; whether the defendant interposes
dilatory measures; whether the call of the docket is largely in arrears or
is up-to-date; and, perhaps, upon whether there is a successful appeal
and a new trial with the consequent annulment of the old judgment and
the rendition of a new one. Under these circumstances it may well
happen that, in one case, where judgment is not delayed, the plaintiff
will recover a substantial sum, while in a precisely similar case, where
judgment is delayed until the foreign currency has greatly depreciated,
the sum recovered by comparison may be altogether insignificant. See
Page v. Levenson, supra. pp. 558, 559;Lebeaupin v. Crispin, supra. pp.
722,723.
I am of the opinion, therefore, that the judgment below should
be affirmed.
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After the decision of November 23, 1926, the respondent
Humphrey filed a petition for rehearing, stating:
The majority opinion holds that German Marks must be reduced to
American money for the purposes of the American judgment as of their
value at the beginning of the suit (July 9, 1921). While both the lower
courts and the minority opinion and what appears to be the great
weight of authority ***hold that the breach date (June 12, 1915) ***is
the proper date. (Emphasis supplied)
Deutsche Bank filed a memorandum in opposition which neither
stated or assumed that the majority opinion had decided that the
judgment date controlled. It said in part:
Would respondent argue that an American debtor on a dollar
debt payable to an American creditor in America which became due in
1915 is responsible in damages to his American creditor if the American
creditor did not commence suit until 1921 ***

(Emphasis supplied.)

(P.3)
The Supreme Court's mandate went down on November 23 "for
further proceedings in accordance with the opinion." A similar case by
Humphrey against another German bank was pending in the same
district, and on December 15, 1926, the Attorney General wrote the
United States Attorney in San Francisco as follows:
***The Department assumes that one of the reasons for the
delay of the trial in the case has been the fact that you were awaiting a
decision in the other case against the Custodian by the same plaintiff
but against funds of the Deutsche Bank. The other case has now been
decided by the Supreme Court, as you are doubtless aware.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals and the District Court and held that in calculating the amount
of a decree in favor of the plaintiff upon a debt owing in marks in
Germany the rate of exchange as of the date the suit was brought

should be adopted. A copy of the Supreme Court's decision is enclosed
herewith for your information. (Emphasis supplied.)
Counsel for Deutsche Bank drafted a stipulation setting forth the

value of the Mark to be filed in the district court to enable the entry of
a decree upon the mandate. This stipulation set forth the rates of
exchange on July 9, 1921, the date of filing suit, and on April 8, 1924,
the date of the original judgment in the district court. It was approved
by the Department of Justice without question, and forwarded to the
United States Attorney for signing on behalf of the government
defendants.
The United States Attorney wrote to the Attorney General in
response under date of Februrary 10, 1927:
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Mr. Spitzer, representative of Peaslee, Brigham & Gennert, the
New York Attorneys for the defendant, DIE DEUTSCHE BANK
FILIALE NURNBERG, called at this Office and stated that the
attorney for the plaintiff has consented to a decree being entered in the
above-entitled matter. He stated that the stipulation forwarded to this
Office, in your letter of the 29th ult., would not be necessary by reason
of the plaintiffs consent.
A decree was entered on February 11, 1927, with the consent of
the attorneys for the plaintiff, Humphrey, and the attorneys for the
Deutsche Bank, reversing the decree of April 8, 1924, and giving
judgment against the plaintiff in favor of the Deutsche Bank in the
amount of $321.10 for costs in the Supreme Court, and judgment in
favor of the plaintiff against the defendant, Deutsche Bank, in the
amount of 1. The decree reads in part:
***and this cause having come on to be heard at this term and
submitted for a decree in conformity with the opinion of reversal by

said court, and a stipulation setting forth the value of the German mark
on the date of the entry of judgment, signed in behalf of all of the

parties, having been submitted showing the value of the German mark
on that date to have been $.000000000000215***

So much for the proceedings in the litigation.
Now how shall we interpret a decision where the decree on the
Supreme Court's mandate was not "in conformity with its opinion"?
Why did Humphrey consent to the entry of a decree on the basis of a
mark of no value on the day of judgment instead of one worth 1.3
cents on the day suit was brought? The answer to this question will be
found in the records of the Mixed Claims Commission, to which we
now go.
ProceedingsBefore the Mixed Claims Commission
Humphrey filed a petition with the Mixed Claims Commission on
December 23, 1922, for payment of the same bank deposit as involved
in the section 9(a) proceedings in the District Court for the Northern
District of California. A memorial was prepared by the agent of the
United States on June 18, 1924, but the claim was permitted to lie
dormant until the following year. On February 28, 1925, the American
agent sent to the claimant a letter advising of an agreement between the
United States and Germany of February 25, 1925, for the payment of
awards for mark balances due American nationals by German nationals
on the basis of one mark equals 16¢, the balance to be stated as of
April 6, 1917. The claimant was advised:
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As a condition precedent to proceedings before the Commission,
it will be necessary for the claimant to execute***a waiver of any right
or rights which he may consider he has to proceed directly against the
German debtor on account of the particular claim either in the courts
of the United States or of Germany or under the Trading with the
Enemy Act. An appropriate form of release acceptable to the
Commission is enclosed herewith.

The claimant di, iot then file the requested waiver. At this date
the appeal from the juLement of the district court giving Humphrey the
right to the 21¢ rate as of date of demand in 1915 had not yet been
argued in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Later on, in 1925, the
American agent wrote Humphrey that he was informed by the German
agent that the Deutsche Bank admitted a bank balance in his favor,
concluding:
The agency would be pleased to receive a statement from you,
concerning what steps, if any, you have taken toward a prosecution in
the American courts of this claim, since it understands that a party by
the name of Humphrey has obtained a judgment against the Deutsche
Bank.
The files of the Mixed Claims Commission disclose no answer to
the latter inquiry, and under date of January 4, 1926, a telegram was
sent to him asking for two copies of the court record of proceedings
against the Deutsche Bank. On September 20, 1926, a memorandum
from the American agent to the German agent with respect to
Humphrey's claim, states:
There seems to be nothing further that we can do in respect of
this claim since we are awaiting the outcome of the appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States.
On November 24, 1926, the American agent said in a memorandum to one of his staff members:
I notice by this morning's papers that the United States Supreme
Court has decided one of the Humphrey cases. I wish you would get a
copy of that decision and take up the Humphrey cases as soon as
possible and see if we cannot dispose of them.
A memorandum of the Supreme Court's decision in the files of the
Mixed Claims Commission emphasizes by underlining that the Court
held the crucial date of conversion to be that when the suit was
brought. On January 19, 1927, the American agent wrote Humphrey
acknowledging receipt of two copies of the record in his proceedings
against the Deutsche Bank and stating:
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In view of the denial of a motion for a rehearing by the United
States Supreme Court, no doubt you will now desire to have this
Agency present your claim to the Commission.
An examination of Exhibits 1 and 2, in the transcript of record
of the Supreme Court of the United States, discloses that on June 30,
1917, the accounts were closed by a payment to the Treuhander. No
doubt you have the original from which this statement was made. If so,
and if you think it desirable for the Agency to make claim against the
Government of Germany on account of this payment valorized at the
rate of one mark equals 17.4 cents, you are requested to submit all
available evidence in support of this contention. If not, claim will be
made against the bank for a debt, the marks to be valorized at one mark
equals sixteen cents.
On July 28, 1927, the American agent telegraphed Humphrey as
follows:
Reference your Deutsche Bank List 550 have you accepted
payment of judgment? Has judgment been satisfied and record thereof
made? Please wire.
Humphrey responded as follows by letter of July 28, 1927, first
quoting a reply by wire:
"REFERRING MY DEUTSCHE BANK CLAIM LIST FIFTY FIVE
HUNDRED I HAVE NEITHER ACCEPTED PAYMENT OF JUDGMENT NOR HAS JUDGMENT BEEN SATISFIED AND NO SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT HAS BEEN ENTERED***"
"I WAS AWARDED SOME 21 IN THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT; THE DEUTSCHE BANK APPEALED; THE
DECISION IN THE LOWER COURT WAS SUSTAINED. THE
APPEAL WAS THEN TAKEN TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT WHICH DECIDED AGAINST ME, FIVE TO FOUR, AND I
HAD TO PAY THE COSTS, AMOUNTING TO $321.09. DURING
THE LITIGATION I RESERVED MY RIGHTS TO FILE MY CLAIM
WITH THE MIXED CLAIM COMMISSION, WHICH WAS DONE; AND
REFERRING TO YOUR CORRESPONDENCE I UNDERSTAND THE
CLAIM HAS BEEN SUBMITTED."
On July 29, 1927, the American agent wrote Humphrey,
acknowledging receipt of his letter of July 28, stating:
The agency does not appear to have on file the necessary waivers
which must be filed before an award for a Mark bank balance can be
obtained. The necessary forms are being enclosed herewith, and you are
requested to execute them and return them to this agency by return
mail.
By letter of August 2, 1927, Humphrey wrote to the American
agency:
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I enclose you herewith three waivers by individuals duly
acknowledged. I will accept the offer of the German agent valorizing
the mark at the rate of one mark equal to 16 .
The waiver filed by Humphrey reads in part:
NOW, THEREFORE,***as a condition precedent to the entering
of an appropriate award by the said Mixed Claims Commission, the said
claimant does hereby agree to and does hereby waive any right or rights
there may be to proceed further against the said German national
involved in this particular claim either in the courts of the United States
or of Germany or under the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy
Act approved October 6, 1917, and amendments thereto***
Under date of November 23, 1927, the Commission entered an

award in favor of Humphrey in the total amount of $6,676.89, with
interest at 5% from January 1, 1920. The amount was paid by the
Treasury Department on August 29, 1928.
Why a Decree Pursuant to the Judgment-Day Rule was Entered on the

Mandate Prescribing the Date-of-Filing-Suit Rule.
From the chronologies of the proceedings in the federal courts and
the Mixed Claims Commission it appears fairly obvious why the
decision of the Supreme Court has been regarded as establishing a

judgment day rule.
From the time of the entry of the decree in the trial court in
April, 1924, to the Supreme Court's decision on November 23, 1926,
Humphrey had a judgment for the repayment of his bank balance at the
rate of 21 cents per mark. That was some 5 cents better than he could
receive by an award of the Mixed Claims Commission under the
agreement of February 25, 1925, between the United States and
Germany. He could not receive an award of the Mixed Claims
Commission, however, unless he formally waived his right to any
benefit of a proceeding under the Trading with the Enemy Act. With
the Supreme Court's decision, his mark obligation, as of the date of
filing suit, was reduced in value from 21 cents to 1.3 cents per mark, or
to about 1/20th of what it had been under the district court decree.
Accordingly, faced with the entry of a decree upon the mandate,
Humphrey had a choice of accepting 1.3 cents per mark under the
Supreme Court's decision, or accepting 16 cents per mark as offered by
the Mixed Claims Commission. In order to accept the 16 cents he had
to waive his right to the one cent.
What Humphrey did was to consent to the entry of a decree based
on the value of the mark not at the date of filing suit when it was 1.3
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cents but at the date of judgment when it was .0220 cents per billion
marks.
Mr. Justice Holmes' Vested-Rights Approach to Conflict of Laws
Going back to the two Supreme Court opinions, if the minority
had dissented without an opinion, there would have been no doubt that
the Court had decided that the date of conversion was the day when
suit was brought. In addition to stating the fact that "suit was begun on
July 9, 1921," Justice Holmes used the expression three times: "when
the suit is brought," "before the suit was brought" and "at the moment
suit is brought." He used no other.
The minority refers expressly to the majority opinion only in the
first paragraph which does not directly mention a date for conversion.
The remainder of the dissenting opinion in which "judgment day"
appears can perhaps be explained as directed against the argument of
the Bank for the judgment-day rule. In any event, it is indeed curious to
seek the decision of a divided court in the minority opinion rather than
within the four corners of the majority opinion. At least the Reporter
did not do so, for in 47 Supreme Court Reporter at p. 166 the second
head-note states that the debt "will be determined according to the
value of the mark at the time suit was brought."
Justice Holmes' opinion in Deutsche Bank should be examined as
one of a series in which he expounded his obligation-vested interest
theory of conflict of laws:
Justice Holmes obligatio approach to choice of law problems ... stamps him clearly as one of the judicial exponents of the
vested rights theory ... Early in Mr. Justice Holmes' career on the
Supreme Court, this theory took explicit form in Slater v. Mexican
National Railroad 196 U.S. 120 (1904) ... The language is a complete
statement of [his] theory ... [He] was guided in it in every conflict of
laws case in which he wrote the opinion ... It appears in clear
statement and seems to be controlling many years after the Slater case
in a group of cases dealing with the very complex problems of
fluctuating currencies: Hicks v.Guinness, 269 U.S. 71;Deutsche Bank v.
Humphrey 272 U.S. 517; and Zimmerman v. Sutherland, 274 U.S...
A comparis on of the language of these three cases with that in Slater
shows no change in a period of more than 20 years in Mr. Justice
Holmes' obligatio approach which, as he said in Hicks v. Guinness, led
to results which seemed to flow from fundamental theory and need
other support. .. 7
7

Reiblich, Conflict of Laws Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes, GEO. L. J. 28:1-23.

(1939).
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Mr. Justice Holmes' obligatio approach would lead him to choose
the date of filing suit as the conversion date, because at that time
Humphrey's obligatio acquired under German law became a claim
under American law. What relevance could the day of judgment have in
such an approach? A commentator on the opinion of this writer as
Chief Hearing Examiner of the Office of Alien Property in Reissner v.
Schering-Kahlbaum A. G. Docket 55 D6, in which the thesis of this
article was first advanced, has written:
... the date of filing suit rule is in line with the vested rights theory
which Justice Holmes consistently followed in his decision. This makes
it natural that he did not adapt himself to the black-white clich6 of
either breach day or judgment day rule. This is borne out by his
correspondence with Sir Frederick Pollock about the time of the
Humphrey decision. 8
Mr. Justice Holmes' Correspondence
Mr. Justice Holmes wrote three revealing letters to friends at the
time of the decision in Deutsche Bank. While the case was under
consideration, on October 31, 1926, he wrote9 Sir Frederick Pollock:
Mr. dear Pollock,
... About 200 applications for certiorari (when the case does not
come up as of right) besides sitting in court and writing three opinions.
The last is hung up for a dissent that may put me in a minority. It is a
question of the time for computing the value of the mark in a suit here
to apply property in the hands of the Alien Property Custodian to the
debt of a German bank to an American depositor there. I have paid
little attention to the decisions in other jurisdictions but have gone on
what seems to me unanswerable reasoning, but the dissentients twit me
with my remark in my Common Law that the life of the law has not
been logic but experience and I suppose will quote cases English and
others as leading to a different conclusion. I don't go into it now as it is
sub judice, but I am much interested. No case that I have seen seems to
me to go to the bottom of the question.
Yours ever,
O.W.H.

Sir Frederick Pollock, acknowledging receipt of a copy of the
opinion, replied 9 on December 13:
My dear Holmes:
Thanks for the judgments in Deutsche Bank v. Humphrey. I agree
with yours: There could be no question of any sum payable in dollars
8Galleski, AM. J. COMP. L. 6:111, 113.
9 Holmes-Pollock Letters 190-3, (1940).
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3 No. 2

Deutsche Bank Case

289

until there was an effective demand made in your jurisdiction.
All good wishes for New Year.
Yours ever,
F.P.
On October 23, Mr. Justice Holmes wrote'
My dear Laski:

0

to Harold Laski:

...the constant overpressure of the last three weeks will abate
somewhat with one short adjournment tomorrow. I shall fire off an
opinion and have only one to write on a matter that interests me very
much and will let in about an inch of theory contra some English
intimations in your cases.*
Affectionately yours,
O.W. Holmes
[Editor's footnote:] * Deutsche Bank v. Humphrey
And on November 23, the day of the decision, Mr. Justice Holmes
wrote' o at greater length:
My dear Laski:
...We began sitting again yesterday adjourning at 2 for luncheon, and
McKenna's funeral... Some of the brethren took so long with their
discourses that we shall take some time this morning in finishing-I am
not reached yet. I have one case that interests me much, on the time at
which the mark is to be valued in a suit here against a German bank,
when the demand was made at a time when the mark was worth much
more than when the suit was brought here (to reach money in the
hands of the Alien Property Custodian). It interests me because the
dissent by Sutherland, McReynolds, Butler, Sanford, accord-seems to
me to illustrate, as so many cases do to my mind, the notion that the
law is a brooding omnipresence in the sky, as I once put it. When a man
asserts a legal right he must refer to some law that creates it, and I say
the only right that the plaintiff had was a right created by the German
law-and that was a right to so many marks and nothing else-not to the
value of so many marks in other commodities at a given time-but to so
many marks when the suit was brought. The tendency of some English
and other cases is contra, but none of them that I have seen seems to
me to go to the bottom of the business... (Emphasis supplied)
Affectionately yours,
O.W.H.
Mr. Justice Holmes' statements in his letters to Pollock and Laski
(that he "paid little attention to decisions in other jurisdictions, but
have gone on what seems to me unanswerable reasoning" and "the
1o

2 Holmes-Laski Letters p. 886 (M. Howe, Ed., 1953).
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tendency of some English and other cases is contra, but none of
them ... seems to me to go to the bottom of the business") are not
consistent with a choice-of-the-day-judgment rule which is supported
by many precedents. They point to a rule which is neither judgment
day nor breach day, but a day-of-filing-suit rule flowing from
''unanswerable reasoning."
In the light of Mr. Justice Holmes' extra-judicial statements of his
opinion, it appears incorrect to say that the repeated references in his
opinion to the date of filing suit were "inadvertent" as has been
suggested by some commentators.' 1 When Mr. Justice Holmes meant
judgment day he said judgment day, as is shown by his opinion in Hicks
v. Guinness. There the Court was asked to choose between breach day
and judgment day where a foreign-money obligation was payable in the
United States. After stating that the loss for which indemnity was
sought happened at the moment the contract was broken, Mr. Justice
Holmes stated:
The inconveniences and speculations that would be the result of
a different rule have been pointed out in arguments and decisions, and,
on the other hand, the momentary interest of the country of the forum
may be in favor of taking the date of judgment, but the conclusion to
which we come seems to us to flow from fundamental theory and not
to need other support.
Mr. Justice Holmes' correspondence demonstrates fully that his
three references to "date of filing suit" in his opinion were not
inadvertent.
Contemporary Case Comment
Five law reviews published comments on Deutsche Bank shortly
after its promulgation. Four considered the decision as holding that
foreign currency is to be converted as of the date suit was filed. A fifth,
on what seems tenuous grounds, concluded that the Court held in favor
of the date of judgment.
A commentator in the Columbia Law Review 1 2 wrote:
Although the dissenting opinion seems to consider the majority of the
Court as advocating [sic] that damages should be determined as of the
date of judgment, the majority opinion seems to hold that the date of
the commencement of suit should be used... Another possible theory
1 See Swan, C. J., dissenting in Shaw, Savill, Albion Co. v. The Fredericksburg, 189 F.2d
952, (2d Cir.) e.g. CHEATHAM-GOODRICH-GRISWOLD-REESE, CONFLICT OF LAWS,
CASES AND MATERIALS. 735 (4th ed. 1957)
12 Recent decision, COLUM. L. REV. 27:465-6. (Apr. 1927).
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[supporting the suit-day rule] is that the filing of the suit was
equivalent to filing a lien upon the property in the hands of the Alien
Property Custodian.
In the Virginia Law Review 3 the commentator had no doubt. He
wrote:
Held, the rate of exchange existing at the time the suit was brought
should govern.
He favored, however, the breach-day rule.
A perceptive commentator in the Wisconsin Law Review 1 4 wrote:
The Supreme Court by a 5 to 4 decision decided that the rate of
exchange existing at the time the suit was brought should be used in
determining the value of the marks in dollars... The minority opinion
completely overlooked the holding of the Court that the date of
bringing suit was the proper time to convert ...
An excellent note in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review'

s

said:
The rate of exchange applied was the rate on the date when suit
was brought ... It appears, then, that there are two ways of thinking
neither of which can be preferred to the other on very definite grounds.
One supports the breach date rule; the other supports the suit date rule.
The latter was made clear for the first time in Deutsche Bank v.
Humphrey ...
The fifth comment is one that is largely responsible for the
forty-two years of interpreting Deutsche Bank as establishing the
judgment day rule. Writing in the Harvard Law Review 1 6 the
commentator said:
The most recent case ... Deutsche Bank v. Humphrey ... the
plaintiff urged upon the Court Hicks v. Guinness where in an action on
a contract to deliver marks in the United States, the Court had held for
the breach date rule. But the Court decided that the rate of exchange at
the date of judgment should apply.
From the first sentence a footnote (number 16) was dropped
which reads:
The Court states that the American Law should enforce no greater
obligation than exists by that (the German) law at the moment when
the suit is brought. This has been construed as holding that the foreign
currency must be converted into dollars at the rate prevailing when suit
is commenced. See headnote 47 Sup. Ct. 166. It seems, however, that
Recent decisions, VA. L. REV. 13:328 (Feb. 1927).
Glen H. Bell, Recent cases, WISC. L. REV. 4:233-236 (1927).
1 0. J.XW. (Owen J. Wister), Notes, U. of PA. L. REV. 75:448-54 (1927).
16 Recent cases, HARV. L. REV. 40:619-25 (1927). Professor Beale tells us that the
author of this otherwise superb note was his student Carlyle E. Maw now of the New York bar.
13

14
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the only alternatives considered by the Court were the breach date and
judgment date, and the dissenting opinion treats the case as a holding in
favor of the judgment date rule. Furthermore the reasoning of the
majority and particularly the statement that 'it (the defendant's
obligation) was and continued to be a liability in marks alone and was
open to satisfaction by payment of that number of marks at any time'
is inconsistent with the view that the date of bringing suit should
control.
The first reason begs the question, unless the commentator means
"the only alternatives argued by the parties"; the second, even if true,
could scarcely justify disregarding the plain words of the majority
opinion; and the third is doubtful, because, as we have seen, Mr. Justice
Holmes' vested-rights approach to conflict of laws favors choice of the
date of filing suit. In any event, the exegesis is one which transforms a
decision by a Court with four members favoring the breach-day rule
and five favoring the day-of-filing-suit rule1 '7 into a decision for
the-day-of-judgment rule which not a single justice expressly favored.
Professor Beale, without any analysis of his own of Deutsche
Bank, reprinted this comment from the Harvard Law Review in his
treatise on Conflict of Laws, as support for his statement of the
judgment-day rule. Curiously enough, Professor Beale omitted the
all-important footnote, supra, which gives the Commentator's reasons
for stating that "the Court decided that the rate of exchange at the date
of judgment should apply."
As the Reporter for the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,
Professor Beale had the rule adopted by the American Law Institute.
The judgment day rule is now enshrined in Restatement, Second, of
Conflict of Laws, as Section 144 of Part I of the Proposed Official
Draft-( 1967), and the Reporter's note says that "the rule is in accord
with the decision . . . in Deutsche Bank" and with Section 424 of the

original Restatement. It again cites in support the above note in 40
Harvard Law Review.
Finally, there is a more authoritative exposition of Humphreyin
Hackworth's Digest. In an extensive discussion of Damages in a chapter
on State Responsibility and InternationalClaims,1 8 Hackworth says:
By a 5 to 4 decision the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and
held that the rate of exchange to be adopted was that existing on the
date the action was instituted for the reason, as explained by the Court,
that prior to institution of the action there existed only a duty to pay
3 Section 424, (1934).
17 Now who's begging the question?
18 V. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 735 (1943).
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marks in Germany, that the bringing of suit raised for the first time in
the United States a duty to pay in the United States, and that the
extent of the duty in the United States must be measured in the
currency of the United States as of the date the duty arose.
The Judgment-Day Rule is Impractical and Unjust
Aside from the question of the actual decision in Deutsche Bank,
the occasional impracticality and injustice of the judgment-day rule
should cause us to resolve any doubt against it. Mr. Justice Sutherland
for the minority argued most cogently against its adoption. Some
courts have subsequently found it irrational and unjust.1 9
Dissenting in Paris v. Central Chiclera S. de R. L., 193 F.2d 960

(5th Cir. 1952) Chief Judge Rives wrote:
By invoking the law's delays and defending and ultimately losing the
suit, the defendant has gained more than $8000 and the plaintiff has
lost a like amount, nearly half its claim.
Whether Deutsche Bank v. Humphrey actually does necessitate such.
an unjust result is a question requiring the most searching consideration...
In the writer's personal experience, he has seen the claims of many
non-enemy creditors asserting their foreign currency claims against
assets impounded by the Alien Property Custodian slashed drastically in
amounts by the Custodian's application of the judgment-day rule. Many
more foreign-currency obligations were paid from impounded funds by
the Custodian after both world wars than ever reached the Courts.
Processing these claims took several years during a period of changing
values of the foreign money. Applying the judgment-day rule meant
that those processed first received more on their debts than those
processed last. In his opinion in the Reissner claim, referred to above,
this writer said:
An examination of section 34 (of the Trading with the Enemy Act)
moreover, discloses the practical impossibility of following any judgment day rule. The majority of debt claims are disposed of without
even an administrative contest. Few go to any adjudication which
resembles a judgment. Which one of the several procedural stages set
forth in sections 502.201-502.204 of the Rules of Procedure for Claims
shall be taken as "judgment day"? If an appeal from a final
administrative decision is taken by a debt claimant to the district court
of the District of Columbia is his claim to be subject to the vagaries of
19 But see Transmontand v.

S. A. Empresa de Vialao Aerea. 350 F.2d 468 (D. C. Cir. 1965)

in which Judge McGowan in a tort case applied the day of judgment rule as "the sounder rule"
and Shaw, Albion Co. v. The Fredericksburg, supra, note 11.
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foreign exchange fluctuations for perhaps several years more while
awaiting a final judgment?

In that particular case, an appeal did go to the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia which decided it nine years after the claim
was filed with the Custodian on February 24, 1948.20 The claimant
suffered a loss of more than ninety percent of the value of his claim. Is
it now too late to apply Deutsche Bank as Mr. Justice Holmes wrote it?
Beginning in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals with an opinion
by Judge Manton in Thorton v. National City Bank2 1 in 1930,
followed by one by Judge Augustus Hand in Tillman v. Russo-Asiatic
Bank 2 2 in 193 1, the erroneous interpretation of Deutsche Bank was
adopted by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Indian Refining Co.
v. Valvoline Oil Co.2 " in 1935. The first case in which the erroneous
interpretation of Deutsche Bank was induced by a reference to the
decree entered pursuant to Humphrey's waiver of his right to take
under the majority opinion, appears to be Royal Ins. Co. v. Compania
TransatlanticaEspanola2 4 in 1932, in which the following appears:
BYERS, District Judge:
All that can be said in favor of the view that, in fairness, the
libelant should be entitled to have its recovery stated in dollars, at the
rate of exchange for pesetas on March 31, 1929, when the return of the
excess payment became obligatory, has been stated in the dissenting
opinion in the case of Deutsche Bank v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517.
The decision in that case, however, is squarely to the effect that,
where the only liability in suit is one incurred by a corporation of a
foreign country, and which the laws of that country might impose, the
obligation is not enlarged by the fact that the creditor happens to be
able to catch his debtor here, and no greater obligation will be imposed
than exists by the foreign law when suit is brought.
The rate of exchange, therefore, at the date of the filing of this
libel will govern the extent of the libelant's recovery...
Supplemental Opinion
On settlement of the decree herein, counsel pointed out that in the
judgment entered upon the decision of the case of Deutsche Bank v.
Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517, the rate of exchange was fixed as of the date
20 276 F.2d 506 (D. Cir. 1960).
21 45 F.2d 127 (2d Cir.)
22 51 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir.)
23 75 F.2d 797 (7th Cir.)
24 57 F.2d 288, 291 (E.D.N.Y.)
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of judgment and not as at the moment when suit was brought as stated
in the prevailing opinion and the decree entered on the foregoing
opinion will conform to the decision in that case...
The court was undoubtedly not informed of the reason for the entry of
a decree in Deutsche Bank at variance with the mandate.
The Reissner debt claim referred to above was taken to the
District Court for the District of Columbia which sustained the Hearing
Examiner, but the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.2 s
Writing for the Court, Judge Washington said:
In Deutsche Bank v. Humphrey the Supreme Court held that the
amount recoverable in foreign currency was to be converted into dollars
at the rate of exchange on the date judgment was entered .... The view
urged here that Deutsche Bank has been misread and that it really
established as the conversion date the date on which the claim was filed
has been considered and rejected in several of the cases cited above. We
think that the question is now to be regarded as settled, that we are
bound to apply the judgment day rule to cases like the present.
Is error so sanctified by time that it is impossible to rectify? Can a
dozen Court of Appeals decisions overrule the Supreme Court?
The courts referred to by Judge Washington as having rejected the
view that the correct interpretation of Justice Holmes' opinion is that it
holds for the date of filing suit did not have before them the material
set forth in this article. No court, no text writer, no author of a law
review article, appears to have examined the files of the Mixed Claims
Commission, or the correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes, or the
correspondence with the parties and the United States Attorney in the
Department of Justice files. Nor have they censidered extensively the
possible injustices and occasional impracticability of the judgment-day
rule.
Conclusion
In a suit on an obligation governed by foreign law and payable in
foreign currency it is of crucial importance to know whether the court
in a judgment for the plaintiff will convert the foreign currency into
dollars as of the date of the breach, the date of filing suit, or the date of
the judgment. The difference in results between choosing the date of
filing suit rather than the breach date could be substantial. But choice
of the date of judgment could be catastrophic.
25

Supra, note 20.
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Deutsche Bank held that the date of filing suit is the proper date,
but the decision has been misread by the courts, text writers and
restaters of the law for 42 years.
That Mr. Justice Holmes meant the date of filing suit when he said
so, rather than the date of judgment supposedly attributed to him by
the minority opinion, is supported by reference to his vested rights
theory of conflict of laws. The date of filing suit choice is consistent
with his opinion in Hicks where in a litigation on a foreign currency
obligation payable in the United States Mr. Justice Holmes chose the
breach day because the contract was governed by American law from
its inception, and the loss "happened at the moment when the contract
is broken." In Deutsche Bank there was no obligation under American
law until the suit was filed. Filing suit served as the demand and caused
the vesting of rights in the plaintiff. As pointed out in Mr. Justice
Sutherland's cogent dissent, judgment day has no relevance.
Mr. Justice Holmes' correspondence with Sir Frederick Pollock
and Harold Laski is consistent only with a decision for the date of filing
suit. All but one of the contemporary case comments and notes support
the reading of the opinion as it was written.
While there may be some cases where conversion of the foreign
currency on the judgment day will give an equitable result, more often
it can result in an unconscionable loss to the plaintiff and an
undeserved windfall to the defendant.
If it is too late to induce the American Law Institute to change the
black letter rule of Section 144 in Part 1 of its Proposed Official Draft
of Restatement Second on Conflict of Laws to reflect correctly Mr.
Justice Holmes' opinion and the decision in Deutsche Bank, let us hope
that the Supreme Court will review the question at its earliest
opportunity.
Law, said Mr. Justice Holmes in "The Path of the Law," is a
prophecy "of what the courts will do in fact." Perhaps we should add
to the definition: "and a speculation on what the courts have done."
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